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Abstract—Security Requirements Engineering (SRE) is con-
cerned with the identification of security needs and the spec-
ification of security requirements of the system-to-be. Main-
stream approaches to SRE either focus on technical security
mechanisms or suggest high-level organizational abstractions
that are hard to map to the actual design. Social commitments
are a simple yet powerful abstraction to model social interac-
tions and can be used effectively to specify security require-
ments. In this paper, we build on our previous work proposing a
novel goal-oriented modelling language called SecCo—Security
via Commitments—where the concept of social commitment
between social and technical actors is adopted to specify
security requirements. Commitments enable the development
of robust applications, wherein security needs are satisfied by
assigning contractual validity to interactions.
Keywords-Security requirements; Goal models; Commit-
ments
I. INTRODUCTION
Software systems are subject to security threats which in-
fluence organizational assets [1]. Security requirements are,
therefore, specified and then translated to a set of security
mechanisms to be developed in the actual system. While
some security threats are technological (e.g., distributed de-
nial of service attacks and viruses), others are social, as they
arise from the interaction between humans/organizations and
software, and how information is manipulated.
The importance of considering security from a social and
organizational perspective is widely recognized in litera-
ture [2]–[5]. However, such approaches still do not character-
ize high-level organizational security needs in terms of more
specific security mechanisms to implement. Solutions either
rely on purely technical mechanisms (e.g. [1]), or suggest
high-level concepts (e.g. [2], [3]) that are hard to map to
technical security requirements.
Analysing security from an organizational perspective
means analysing social interactions between actors, their
responsibilities, information flow constraints, norms and
laws actors should comply with. Social commitments are
a simple yet powerful abstraction to model social interac-
tions [6]. A commitment is a quaternary relation C(debtor,
creditor, antecedent, consequent) in which a debtor agent
promises (commits) to a creditor agent that, if the antecedent
is brought about, the consequent will be brought about.
Commitments are purely social abstractions that are rooted
in interaction: they are created and they evolve as agents
exchange messages. Since they have contractual validity,
commitments can be used to build robust applications: non-
compliance might lead to further commitments on the part
of the violator.
Commitments are an effective means to specify security
requirements too. An agent can commit to another for the
integrity of a resource, for the non-disclosure of confidential
data, for the usage of some resource according to the need-
to-know principle, for the redundant fulfilment of a delegated
goal, for the non-repudiation of a delegated goal, and so
on. These security requirements can be effectively mapped
to service interfaces, in which the provider commits to the
consumer for the satisfaction of certain security properties
while delivering the service.
In this paper, we start from our previous work on (Se-
cure) Tropos [3] and we propose a novel goal-oriented
modelling language to specify security requirements via
commitments. The language is called SecCo (Security via
Commitments) and proposes, along with a revised set of
high-level organizational concepts from Tropos (i.e., actor,
goal, delegation, authorization, . . . ), the concept of social
commitment between social and technical actors to specify
security requirements. Commitment specifications can be
used for the design and the development of applications
whose interactions satisfy the security needs.
The paper is structured as follows. Section II presents
related work. Section III outlines the SecCo language.
Section IV describes the three operational views of SecCo
(social, resource, authorization) that enable modelling secu-
rity needs. Section V introduces the commitments view that
specifies security requirements via commitments. Section VI
discusses the approach and presents our conclusions.
II. RELATED WORK
The requirements engineering community has acknowl-
edged the importance of considering security since the early
stages of software development [7], [8].
In [9], the authors introduce a framework for security
requirements based on the notions of delegation and trust
of execution / permission. Monitoring is used as an organi-
zational pattern to overcome trust issues. SecCo, instead,
ensures security via commitments, concentrating on the
interaction between actors.
Secure Tropos [10] models security concerns throughout
the whole development process. Security requirements are
expressed as security constraints, which should be satisfied
together with the functional requirements. Potential threats
and attacks are considered as well, to analyse and find
the best way to overcome possible vulnerabilities. SecCo
separates security needs from security requirements, and
binds security to interaction via commitments.
Abuse cases [11] extend use cases to capture and anal-
yse security requirements. An abuse case specifies a type
of interaction between a system and one or more actors,
where the results of the interactions are negative/harmful. It
includes a range of security concerns that might be abused,
as well as a description of the harm that might be caused.
In a similar spirit, misuse cases [12] exploit use cases to
represent sequences of actions that a system or other entities
can perform, interacting with misusers of the entity and
causing harm if the sequence is allowed to complete. These
approaches exploit negative scenarios to elicit and analyse
security requirements. SecCo focuses on how actors should
interact, and defines a set of commitments that protects their
interaction. The approaches are complementary.
Lamsweerde [5] deals with security engineering at the
application layer. Security requirements are specified by two
models: a model of the system-to-be and an anti-model. The
anti-model includes vulnerabilities and capabilities needed to
achieve the anti-goals of the security goals (from the former
model) that are endangered. Anti-goals are refined in threat
trees, whose leaf nodes represent either vulnerabilities ob-
servable by the attacker or anti-requirements implementable
by the attacker. Differently, SecCo captures security at the
organizational level.
Liu et al. [2] present a goal-oriented methodology based
on i* to deal with security and privacy requirements. Se-
curity dimensions are modelled as softgoals, and security
requirements analysis is performed to verify whether the
system is secure. Analysis identifies potential system attack-
ers/abusers, vulnerabilities (propagated along dependency
links), thereby suggesting countermeasures. Their solution
falls short when considering security issues through the later
phases of the development process [10].
Elahi’s work [13] extends the i* framework by sup-
porting security trade-off analysis. The authors propose a
conceptual modelling technique to reach a good enough
security level in a multi-actor setting. This technique offers
the possibility to assess the impact of assessing security
mechanisms on actors’ goals and threats. Vulnerabilities
refer to the deficiencies in the structure of goals and activities
of intentional agents. Unlike SecCo, they do not take into
account vulnerabilities related to actors interaction.
Haley et al. [4] define security requirements as constraints
over functional requirements. They consider context as an
important factor having a deep effect on security require-
ments. Moreover, a structure of satisfaction arguments is
employed to verify the correctness of security requirements.
SecCo considers security earlier, at the organizational level,
and binds security to interaction.
Breaux and Anto´n [14] present a methodology to system-
atically extract security (legal) requirements from regulatory
texts. They acquire and present data requirements, thereby
assigning priorities to them, to ensure law compliance and
avoid inappropriate information disclosure. Though relying
on contractual rules, they focus only on data usage.
III. SECCO MODELLING LANGUAGE: OVERVIEW
We provide an outline of SecCo (Security Commitments),
our modelling language for SRE. Like other goal-oriented
approaches to SRE, e.g. [2], [3], [10], SecCo describes
the organization in terms of intentional actors (i.e. having
goals). The actors we consider are also social: they depend
one on another for the fulfilment of their respective goals.
Actor intentionality and sociality are supported by the social
view (IV-A). SecCo enables to express security needs to
constrain how interaction takes place. For instance, an actor
might want to guarantee the confidentiality of an exchanged
resource, or redundant fulfilment of a delegated task.
Figure 1. From the operational view to security requirements
Actors use and exchange resources to fulfil their goals.
SecCo’s resource (Section IV-B) and authorization (Sec-
tion IV-C) views support an elaborated characterization
of resources and distinguish between the actual usage of
resources and the granted authorizations.
Identifying security needs and discovering potential
breaches is not sufficient to successfully complete security
requirements analysis. The missing step is specifying secu-
rity requirements that, if implemented, satisfy the security
needs. To this extent, SecCo relies on the concept of
commitment. Security requirements are a set of commit-
ments between actors (Section V). Such commitments shall
be established—via security mechanisms—and continuously
monitored. Actors can make commitments to ensure redun-
dancy, integrity, non-disclosure, need-to-know, etc.
Figure 1 outlines SecCo. Security needs are a key concept:
they are expressed in the operational view that describes
the setting and are supported by the commitments view.
The operational view consists of three views: social, au-
thorization, and resource. Together, these views provide a
comprehensive picture of the setting which includes both
business concerns and security aspects. The commitments
view specifies the security requirements for the system to-
be; it is automatically derived from the operational view.
Running example. We consider the compliance of Ital-
ian public administrations, such as universities, to Italian
security and privacy legislation [9]. This law/act specifies re-
quirements over the public administrations to devise internal
regulations and policies, based on the ISO-17799 standard,
that regulate personal data usage, update, modification and
production. The University of Trento (UniTn) has enforced
the Data Protection Act since January 14th, 2002.
UniTn offers several international programmes that attract
a large number of international students. Suppose an in-
ternational student needs a document from the programme
coordinator; such document has to be presented to the local
immigration office to get his stay permit extended. The
following roles are involved:
• Student: needs an official document to prove he is
enrolled in the study programme and his incomes are
enough to afford the stay. He asks the programme
coordinator to issue the document. For this reason, he
has to provide his personal data, as well as financial
information. His personal data is stored in the UniTn
information system.
• Programme Coordinator: issues the official document
for the student. He might transfer responsibility for
parts of this activity to his secretary.
• Secretary: retrieves student information (personal data
and financial data) from the information system and
drafts the document.
• IS Manager: manages the information about students
stored in the UniTn information system in accordance
with confidentiality restrictions.
IV. MODELLING SECURITY NEEDS
We detail the three sub-views that constitute the opera-
tional view of SecCo. Together, these views enable mod-
elling the security needs expressed by stakeholders.
A. Social view
The social view builds on top of existing goal-oriented
languages for SRE, in particular SI* [9]. Our aim is to
stay with a minimal and consistent set of concepts that can
be effectively used to depict the operational aspects of the
considered setting. Figure 2 illustrates the social view on the
running example.
We consider an abstract concept of actor, and refine it to
two distinct concrete concepts: role and agent. Agents play
(adopt) roles at runtime, and they can change the roles they
play. Some agents are known since requirements-time. For
instance, the prefecture of Trento is an agent, for students
should invariably interact with it to renew their stay permit.
An actor wants to achieve one or more goals, and has
capabilities to fulfil some of them without interacting with
others. A goal can be AND/OR decomposed to two or more
subgoals. In an AND-decomposition (OR-decomposition),
the parent goal is achieved if all (at least one) subgoals are
satisfied. Goals can contribute to one another. We support
two types of full contribution. In positive (negative) con-
tribution, the satisfaction of one goal gives evidence for the
satisfaction (denial) of the contributed goal [15]. In Figure 2,
the secretary wants to achieve goals “write new document”,
“get student records”, etc. She has capability for “get student
records”, which is AND-decomposed to two sub-goals.
We tie together goals and resources in various ways:
• an actor possesses (disposes of) a set of resources;
• an actor needs one or more resources to fulfil a goal;
• an actor produces resources while fulfilling a goal;
• an actor modifies a resource while fulfilling a goal.
A resource is modified if, despite of the change or
update, the resource identity is unvaried. For example,
the personal data file of a student can be modified if
the student’s address changed.
In Figure 2, the secretary’s goal “Write new document”
produces an “Official document” for the student and needs
resource “Document template”. The secretary possesses re-
source “Document template”.
We consider social actors that collaborate to fulfil their
own objectives. SecCo supports two types of social rela-
tionship: goal delegation and resource provision. Whereas
the former captures the expectations of one actor on others
(the goals he delegates), the latter represents the exchange
of resources among actors.
A key concept in the social view is that of security need.
This term refers to the expectations concerning security that
actors impose on the social relationships they participate in.
Goal delegation. A delegator actor delegates the fulfil-
ment of a goal (delegatum) to a different delegatee actor.
In Figure 2, the student delegates the fulfilment of goal
“Write document for immigration office” to the programme
coordinator. Delegations can have a set of security needs
that involved actors should preserve. Some of these needs
are the following:
• Non-repudiation (NonRep): the delegator actor wants
the delegatee actor not to be able to challenge the va-
lidity of the goal delegation. A non-repudiation security
need requires the adoption of security mechanisms that
guarantee the delegatee cannot repudiate the delegation.
As we will detail in Section V, such security solution
consists of the establishment of a commitment—for
the non-repudiation of that goal delegation—from the
delegatee to the delegator. For instance, the programme
coordinator wants non-repudiation for the delegation of
his goal “Write new document” to the secretary.
Figure 2. Social view for the stay permit scenario
• Redundancy (Red): the delegatee has to adopt redun-
dant strategies for the achievement of the delegated
goal. He can either use different internal capabilities, or
can rely on multiple actors. To guarantee such security
need, the delegatee has to make a commitment to the
delegator for redundant fulfilment of the goal.
• No-delegation (NoDel): the delegator wants the del-
egatee not to further delegate goal fulfilment. No-
delegation is closely related to trust: the delegator trusts
that specific delegatee for some goal, and does not trust
other actors the delegatee might want to involve. Such
security need implies a commitment from the delegatee
to the delegator: the delegatee promises not to further
delegate the fulfilment of that goal. For example, the
secretary wants the IS Manager not to delegate goal
“Get student personal data”; she might fear someone
else would violate data confidentiality.
Resource provision. This relationship specifies the ex-
change of tangible resources (TResource) between actors.
Intangible resources (e.g. ideas) cannot be transferred unless
made concrete by a tangible means (e.g. a paper, an e-mail).
We further elaborate on this distinction in Section IV-B.
Resource provision can be subject to security needs that
restrict the usage of received resources. SecCo consider these
needs by combining its three operational views. This will
become clearer in Section IV-C.
B. Resource view
Resources play a key role in the social view: actors
possess resources as well as they use, modify, produce,
and distribute them while fulfilling their goals. The purpose
of SecCo’s resource view is to devise adequate modelling
primitives to characterize resources. We consider only infor-
mational resources.
Similarly to [4], a resource can be tangible (TResource)
or intangible (IResource). Tangible resources reflect the
concrete entities (including electronic ones, such as e-mails)
that actors exchange (via resource provision). Intangible
resources reflect the informational content that actors intend
to transfer by exchanging tangible resources. Intangible re-
sources are exchanged only when madeTangibleBy a tangible
resource. For instance, in Figure 3, the “Financial status” of
the student is an intangible resource (it exists irrespective
of any tangible resource representing it). Such information
can be transferred only if made tangible; for example, when
represented by a printed “Income statement”.
Figure 3. Resource view for the stay permit scenario
Another feature of the resource view is to support com-
posite resources. We enable that by means of the partOf
relation, which can be applied between homogeneous re-
sources (tangible to tangible, intangible to intangible). This
allows for representing that a “signed official document” is
part of the “application package” the student should deliver.
The resource view is flexible in representing resources
and the relations between them:
• An intangible resource can be made tangible by differ-
ent tangible resources. For instance, “Personal data” is
made tangible by both “Personal data file” and “Official
document”.
• A tangible resource can have no relevant intangible
resource. For instance, “Document template” contains
no relevant information concerning the issuing of a
permit of stay for an international student.
• A tangible resource might be part of multiple tangible
resources. Though not in Figure 3, an “Income state-
ment” might be part of a scholarship application too.
C. Authorization view
An adequate representation of authorizations is necessary
to determine if resources are exchanged and used in com-
pliance with confidentiality restrictions. The resource owner
is the unique actor that can legitimately transfer rights to
other actors. However, he might transfer full rights to another
actor, so that the latter becomes entitled to transfer the same
rights the owner can grant.
An actor owns an arbitrary number of intangible re-
sources. We do not take into account resources with multiple
owners here. We support the transfer of rights between two
actors via delegation of authority. An actor can grant/receive
an arbitrary number of delegations of authority. Authority
can be specified along three dimensions:
• Scope: authority over resources can be limited to their
usage in the scope of a specific purpose (i.e. certain
goals). In SecCo, if a goal is in the scope, all its sub-
goals—according to the delegator’s goal model—are in
scope too.
• Operations: transferred rights relate to different oper-
ations/actions an actor can perform on the resources.
In SecCo, we support four basic operations: usage,
modification, production, and distribution. We do not
consider revocation of permissions in this paper. The
four supported operations are directly linked to the
way resources are manipulated by actors in the social
view. Authority of usage goes in parallel with the
needs relation, authority of modification with modifies,
authority of production with produces relation, and
authority of distribution with resource provision.
• Authority to delegate: when the actor receiving the
authority can further delegate such authority to other
actors. In SecCo, we support a special kind of author-
ity called AuthorityToDelegate (see [16]). This is a
stronger authority that includes not only the permission
to perform operations, but also that of further propa-
gating rights over those resources to other actors. Such
further delegation should, however, be compatible with
the authority scope the delegator is granted.
Figure 4. Authorization view for the stay permit scenario
Figure 4 shows the authorization view for the stay permit
scenario. The student owns his “Personal data” and “Finan-
cial status”. The white boxes on top of arrows are authoriza-
tions. Depending on the arrow line, authorization to delegate
is granted (full line) or not (dotted line). An authorization
box contains three slots: the upper slot is the list of resources
over which authorization is delegated; the lower slot is the
scope; and the right slot defines the allowed operations
(from top to bottom: use, modify, produce, distribute). The
student authorizes the usage of personal data and financial
status to the programme coordinator in the scope of goal
“Write document for immigration office”. Since authority to
delegate is transferred, the programme coordinator delegates
authority to use personal data and financial status to the
secretary in the scope of goal “Get student records” (which
is a sub-goal of “Write document for immigration office”).
Authority to delegate is not transferred to the secretary.
The authorization view expresses security needs on the
use of resources. Some of these needs are the following:
• Non-disclosure: when authority is granted without
transferring authority to delegate. An actor grants an-
other the authority to perform some operations on a
resource (any combination of use, modify, produce,
distribute), as long as the resource is not disclosed
to unauthorized actors. For example, the IS Manager
expresses such security need in the authorization over
resources personal data and financial status granted to
the secretary.
• Need-to-know: when the transfer of authority to dele-
gate is restricted to a goal scope. The actor granting the
authority enables the delegatee to delegate permission
to others as long as other actors conduct operations on
the resource within the specified scope. The student’s
authorization to the IS Manager expresses a need-to-
know security need: personal data and financial status
should be produced or distributed in the scope of goal
“Write document for immigration office”.
• Integrity: when the authority to modify is not granted to
the delegatee. The IS Manager expresses such security
need on the delegation of authority over resources
personal data and financial status to the secretary.
V. SPECIFYING SECURITY REQUIREMENTS VIA
COMMITMENTS
The operational view described in the previous sections
models business aspects of the considered setting as well
as security needs. As shown in Section IV-C, however,
security needs are often modelled implicitly. Thus, security
requirements engineering might be unaware of these needs
and of the security requirements they imply.
SecCo goes one step further with its commitments view.
This view is automatically derived from the operational
view and contains a high-level specification of the security
requirements—expressed via social commitments—that, if
actors comply with, satisfies the security needs. Though not
detailing automated transformation rules, we provide here
the intuition behind the mapping between the security needs
in the operational view and the commitments view.
An important feature of SecCo is to relate security re-
quirements to interaction between actors. However, unlike
technical approaches to computer security, interaction is
understood in business terms. At requirements time, commit-
ments are expressed at the level of roles (with the exception
of the agents that are already known). At runtime, these
commitments shall be made by the involved agents (playing
those roles). After their identification, it is therefore crucial,
during the architectural design phase, to link commitments
to technical security mechanisms that guarantee their satis-
faction.
We specialize the notion of commitment proposed by
Singh [6], so that it can be exploited in the context of
security requirements. In SecCo, a commitment is made by
a debtor actor to a creditor actor for the satisfaction of a
security need. In turn, security needs are defined in terms of
the concepts used in the operational view (as shown in the
previous sections).
The way commitments are implemented is highly depen-
dent on whether the involved actors are agents or roles. If
the debtor is a role, making that commitment becomes a
necessary condition for any agent playing that role, that
has to make such commitment to adopt the role. In other
words, the commitment becomes part of the description of
the role. If the creditor is a role, the commitment is a security
guarantee for any agent playing that role while interacting
with the debtor. If the debtor is an agent, the system to-be
should ensure that the specific agent makes those security
commitments when interacting with others. If the creditor is
an agent, such commitments become prerequisites for other
agents interacting with it.
Id Commitment type
(a) C(a, b,need-to-know(R,G, Ops))Actor a commits to actor b that resources in R will be
used/modified/produced/distributed (as specified in Ops) only
in the scope of the goals in G
(b) C(a, b,non-disclosure(R))
a commits to b that resources in the set R will not be distributed
to unauthorized actors
(c) C(a, b,integrity(R))
a commits to b that resources in R will not be modified
(integrity will be preserved)
(d) C(a, b,non-repudiation(G))
a commits to b that he will not repudiate that a has been
delegated the goals in G
(e) C(a, b,redundancy(G))
a commits to b that redundant strategies will be adopted to
fulfil the goals in G
(f) C(a, b,no-delegation(G))
a commits to b that goal G will not be delegated to others
Table I
COMMITMENT TYPES TO EXPRESS SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
Table I shows how the security needs expressed in the
Id Debtor Creditor Security Requirement
C1 IS Manager Student need-to-know(personal data ∧ financial status, write document for immigration office, p ∧ d)
C2 Progr. Coord. Student need-to-know(personal data ∧ financial status, write document for immigration office, u)
C3 Secretary Progr. Coord. need-to-know(personal data ∧ financial status, get student records ∧ write new document, u)
C4 Secretary IS Manager need-to-know(personal data ∧ financial status, get student records, p ∧ d)
C5 Secretary IS Manager non-disclosure(personal data ∧ financial status)
C6 IS Manager Student integrity(personal data ∧ financial status)
C7 Progr. Coord. Student integrity(personal data ∧ financial status)
C8 Secretary Progr. Coord. integrity(official document)
C9 Secretary IS Manager integrity(personal data ∧ financial status)
C10 Progr. Coord. Student non-repudiation(write document for immigration office)
C11 Secretary Progr. Coord. non-repudiation(write new document ∧ get student records)
C12 IS Manager Secretary non-repudiation(get student personal data ∧ obtain up to date statement)
C13 IS Manager Secretary redundancy(obtain up to date statement)
C14 Secretary Progr. Coord. no-delegation(write new document)
C15 IS Manager Secretary no-delegation(get student personal data ∧ obtain up to date statement)
Table II
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS EXPRESSED VIA COMMITMENTS IN THE STAY PERMIT SCENARIO
operational view lead to specific commitments in the com-
mitments view. Table II lists the commitments for the stay
permit scenario derived from the operational view presented
in the previous sections. the The semantics of the various
commitment types in Table I is as follows:
(a) A need-to-know commitment from a to b implies
that a set of resources R will be used / modified /
produced / distributed (in accordance with the oper-
ations specified in Ops) only within the scope of a
set of goals G. In case the committed actor has the
authority to delegate rights, other actors might be in
turn authorized for the resource. However, to guarantee
the commitment made by a, each of them has to
make a commitment to b for the need-to-know of the
resources. For example, in Table II, the IS Manager
commits (C1) to the student for the need-to-know of
personal data and financial status in the scope of goal
“Write document for the immigration office”. Allowed
operations are production and distribution. In turn, this
implies a commitment (C4) from the secretary to the
IS Manager for the same resources and operations in
the scope of the sub-goal “Get student records”.
(b) A non-disclosure commitment says that the debtor will
not distribute some resources to unauthorized actors.
This type of commitment protects delegations of au-
thority that include resource distribution but not the
authority to delegate such permission. For example,
the secretary commits (C5) to the IS Manager for the
non-disclosure of personal data and financial data.
(c) An integrity commitment for some resources R im-
plies that these resources will not be modified. The
debtor actor commits that not only he will not modify
the resource, but also that—if he distributes such
resource to other actors—each of these actors will
commit for the integrity of the resource. For exam-
ple, the programme coordinator commits (C7) to the
student for the integrity of personal data and financial
status, since he gets no authority to modify such data.
In turn, a similar commitment (C8) is made from the
secretary to the programme coordinator.
(d) Commitments for non-repudiation are essential to sup-
port accountability. We are concerned here with non-
repudiation of goal delegations. The committed actor
promises he will not repudiate that he was delegated
the fulfilment of the goals in G. For example, the
programme coordinator commits (C10) to the student
for the non-repudiation of goal “Write document for
immigration office”.
(e) A commitment for redundant goal fulfilment says that
the debtor will fulfil the goals in G by adopting
redundant strategies. External actors can be involved
too. However, the same goal cannot be delegated twice
to the same actor, as that would not ensure redundancy.
Redundancy commitments support reliability. For ex-
ample, the IS Manager commits (C13) for redundant
fulfilment of goal “Obtain up to date statement”.
The IS Manager can fulfil it by either retrieving two
statements from different databases, or delegating the
task to two technicians, or retrieving a statement from
a database and delegating to a technician.
(f) A no-delegation commitment tells that a debtor will
fulfil a goal without further delegations. Such restric-
tion applies to the descendants of the goal in the goal
tree. The IS Manager commits (C15) to the secretary
that he will not delegate goals “Get student personal
data” and “Obtain up to date statement” to others.
Operationalizing commitments. Security commitments
are security requirements at the organizational level. At the
technical level, they result in operationalization via security
mechanisms that ensure commitments to be satisfied.
Commitment C1 requires to ensure need-to-know. A pos-
sible security mechanism for C1 is to log access to the
information system and require IS users to specify which
is the purpose for which they access confidential data. The
purpose might be inferred from interaction. In our example,
the system to-be can check if the IS manager is using
personal data and financial status upon a request (e.g. by
the secretary) for writing the document for the immigration
office. C6 is about integrity. At least two technical options
exist: preventively denying modification grants to the IS
Manager, or monitoring its access to personal data and
financial status.
C10 is about non-repudiation of goal “Write document
for immigration office”. An information system can be
developed: students delegate this goal through the IS, and the
IS Manager has to accept the task. The log of the information
system is the proof that the delegation was accepted. To
implement commitments C5 (non-disclosure) and C15 (non-
repudiation), the information flow should be tracked. While
C5 directly refers to resources, C15 does it indirectly, since
delegated goals produce resources that can be tracked.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this paper we have presented SecCo, a novel goal-
oriented modelling language for security requirements engi-
neering. SecCo covers both the analysis of security needs—
in its operational view—and the derivation of security
requirements—in its commitments view—that should be
implemented to satisfy the needs.
SecCo specifies requirements via social commitments be-
tween actors, thereby relating security to interactions among
actors. The commitments view is automatically inferred from
the operational view, which consists of three views that
enable requirements engineers to model orthogonal aspects
of the considered setting. We exploit a non-redundant set
of concepts that allows for focussing on the most important
security concerns at the requirements level.
This paper puts the basis for several research threads.
We are particularly interested in using SecCo to design
composite services. To such extent, we plan to: (i) formalize
the automated derivation of the commitments view from the
operational view; (ii) define commitments operationaliza-
tions that detail how security requirements are fulfilled (for
instance, via SLAs); (iii) devise a supporting methodology
for SecCo; (iv) validate the approach on industrial case
studies (from the EU-sponsored project Aniketos).
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